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Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift
LEARNING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Uma Outka†
INTRODUCTION
The environmental justice movement in the United
States forged a pivotal connection among concerns for social
justice, civil rights, and environmental protection. At a time
when the federal environmental statutes enacted in the early
1970s were beginning to mature, the movement drew critical
attention to the disproportionate environmental harm borne by
low-income communities and communities of color. The
movement forced environmentalists to reflect on their biases
and their commitments—to recognize that urban or degraded
landscapes where people live are as much a part of our
environment as the remote wilderness of our national parks. It
made plain that our laws, designed to protect human health
and the environment, were letting environmental justice
communities down.1
Today, as climate change drives a shift in the energy
sector away from fossil fuels and toward low-carbon resources,
calls for “energy justice” and “climate justice” expand the
movement’s conceptual reach in the modern context. These justice
concerns respond to inequality in the distribution of
† Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. The author is
grateful to Dean Mazza for his support, and for helpful comments following presentations
of this work in early form at the Duke Law School Race and Reform Conference and the
Brooklyn Law School Trager Symposium, especially from Professor Gregg Macey. The
author is also grateful to the Commons at the University of Kansas for an
interdisciplinary starter grant that funded a symposium held at KU—“Finding Justice in
the Low-Carbon Shift”—which greatly informed this work. Contact: uoutka@ku.edu.
1 The term “environmental justice communities” is generally understood to
mean “low-income communities and[/or] communities of color.” See, e.g., Mission and
Vision, CAL. ENVTL. JUSTICE ALL., http://caleja.org/about-us/vision-and-history/ [https://
perma.cc/D76J-B7SA]. EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income
with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies,” Environmental Justice, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
environmentaljustice [https://perma.cc/Z8PD-UQ8Q] (last updated Apr. 10, 2017), but
as the discussion infra Part II explains, this is narrower than EJ advocates’ definition.
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environmental harms, as well as access to the environmental,
economic, and social benefits associated with the energy sector
and climate policy.2 The link between climate change, energy,
and environmental justice is unmistakable: the energy sector
contributes to climate change more than any other industry;
climate change is predicted to affect environmental justice
communities most; and the energy sector has a long history with
environmental injustice. In the United States and around the
globe, the energy sector is the primary source of greenhouse gas
emissions, causing atmospheric temperatures to rise.3 The
electric power industry alone is responsible for 30% of total U.S.
greenhouse gasses (GHGs), due mostly to overreliance on coal,
which releases carbon dioxide when burned.4 Historically, the
United States has contributed more to climate change than any
other country and it remains the second highest annual emitter
today, behind only China.5 The low-carbon transition is underway
in the United States and other parts of the world, but it is still
early in the trajectory, and there is a pressing need for it to be
rapid and dramatic.6 The world reaffirmed this premise by
2 These terms are context specific, conceptually broad, and yet connect
closely through their origin in the environmental justice concept. See, e.g., Michael B.
Gerrard, What Does Environmental Justice Mean in an Era of Global Climate Change?,
19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 278 (2013) (considering how climate change is
expanding areas of relevance for the concept of environmental justice); BENJAMIN K.
SOVACOOL ET AL., ENERGY SECURITY, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE 23–29 (2014) (understanding
“energy justice” in terms of “the distribution of energy services as a social good” and “how
the harms of energy production and use are allocated,” including but not limited to
“environmental harms per se”).
3 The energy sector is generally understood to include electricity—which relies
on coal, natural gas, nuclear power, and renewable resources to power industrial,
commercial, and residential users, as well as transportation, which relies almost entirely
on oil.Use of Energy in the United States Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.
eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_use [https://perma.cc/D3NV-J9ED].
4 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/EYT6-FHLJ] (citing EPA, INVENTORY
OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2014 (2016), https://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2016-main-text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G53C-586X]).
5 See Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-
countrys-share-of-co2.html#.V_QGsTKZPdR [https://perma.cc/A3PD-LLWW] (citing U.S.
Energy Information Administration data); see also Mengpin Ge et al., 6 Graphs Explain
the World’s Top 10 Emitters, WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.wri.org/blog/
2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world’s-top-10-emitter [https://perma.cc/XW9C-EQLS].
6 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC),
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/ [https://perma.cc/6ULV-BEBH] (detailing present and
anticipated effects of climate change on human experience); WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN
THEHEAT: WHY A 4°C WARMERWORLDMUST BE AVOIDED (2012), http://documents.world
bank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/pdf/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf [https://perma.cc/S
RZ4-C54G] (summarizing scientific literature and outlining why immediate policy
responses are critical to avoiding climate change impacts).
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international agreement in December 2015, when the Conference
of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate
Change signed the Paris Agreement, recommitting to the original
treaty’s shared goal of “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”7
The impacts of climate change—from extreme weather, to
air quality impacts, to vector-born diseases—are widely expected
to be most severe for those with the fewest resources to adapt.8 A
key message from the Third National Climate Assessment is that
the adaptive capacity and vulnerability of a community is
“influenced by pronounced social inequalities that reflect age,
ethnicity, gender, income, health, and (dis)ability differences.”9
For indigenous peoples in the United States, the Assessment
anticipates climate change impacts will be “especially severe”
because they will exacerbate “persistent social and economic
problems.”10 A special assessment on health impacts explains that
although “all Americans are at risk, some populations are
disproportionately vulnerable, including those with low income[s],
some communities of color, immigrant groups (including those
with limited English proficiency), Indigenous peoples, children
and pregnant women, older adults, vulnerable occupational
groups, persons with disabilities, and persons with preexisting or
chronic medical conditions.”11 Globally, these risks have occupied
international negotiators grappling with how to ensure those who
contributed least to climate change—and are typically most
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9,
1992, S. Treaty. Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
8 See generally U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON HUMAN HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT
(2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/climatehealth2016/low/ClimateHealth2016_FullReport_
small.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAS7-K5JD] (addressing health impacts and vulnerabilities);
CARMENGONZALEZ ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVEREFORM, CLIMATE CHANGE, RESILIENCE,
AND FAIRNESS: HOW NONSTRUCTURAL ADAPTATION CAN PROTECT AND EMPOWER
SOCIALLY VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES ON THE GULF COAST (2016), http://progressive
reform.org/articles/Climate_Change_Resilience_Gulf_Coast_1603.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W4
G-9Y3Q]; RACHEL MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., THE CLIMATE GAP: INEQUALITIES IN HOW
CLIMATE CHANGEHURTS AMERICANS&HOW TO CLOSE THEGAP (2009), https://dornsife.usc.
edu/assets/sites/242/docs/The_Climate_Gap_Full_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HZ
L-RN3U] (addressing the “climate gap” caused by inequality).
9 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THEUNITED STATES: THE THIRDNATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 288 (Jerry M. Melillo et
al. eds., 2014), http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/low/NCA3_Climate_Change_Impacts_
in_the_United%20States_LowRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSM9-GV6Q].
10 Id. at 298.
11 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 2.
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vulnerable to its harmful effects—receive support and funding
for climate adaptation efforts.12
Around the world and in the United States, energy
resource extraction and production has been marked by conflicts
and harms affecting environmental justice communities. The
U.S. petroleum industry has been charged with devastating
environmental harms and human rights abuses in Africa and
South America.13 In the United States, coal-fired power plants
and petroleum refineries along the Gulf Coast provide examples
of the long-standing connection between environmental justice
and the fossil fuel-based energy sector. For example, a recent
NAACP study reports that people living within three miles of a
coal plant have a lower per capita income than the U.S.
average, and among those “39 percent are people of color—a
figure that is higher than the 36 percent proportion of people of
color in the total U.S. population.”14 Coal plants built in urban
areas, the study found, “tend to be disproportionately located
in . . . communities of color.”15 Coal ash disposal in these areas
has likewise led to water and soil contamination, implicating
environmental justice concerns.16
With these linkages in mind, this article advances two
related claims in connection with the low-carbon shift in the
United States. The first is that environmental justice can and
should inform the transition’s trajectory early to achieve robust
integration of the movement’s core principles with legal and
physical infrastructures for a low-carbon energy sector. These
principles include the right to a clean and safe environment,
antidiscrimination, self-determination, equal participation in
decision making, and equal access to resources.17 Environmental
12 See generally Climate Finance, UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/2807.php
[https://perma.cc/H2MY-TRRG] (providing overview of mechanisms within the treaty for
assisting developing country Parties to implement the Convention and acknowledging
these Parties are “less endowed and more vulnerable”).
13 See, e.g., Ava Azad, Remedies for Foreign Citizens Subjected to Outsourced
Pollution: A Case Study of American Big Oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 9 FLA. A & M
U. L. REV. 277 (2014).
14 NAACP, COAL BLOODED: PUTTING PROFITS BEFORE PEOPLE 15, http://www.
naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CoalBlooded.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6QK-ETPD].
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Brian Bienkowski, Spotlight Hits Coal Ash Impact on Poor and
Minority Communities, ENVTL. HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.environmental
healthnews.org/ehs/news/2016/jan/coal-ash-environmental-justice-epa-civil-rights [https://
perma.cc/7K9L-9YCB].
17 See The Principles of Environmental Justice, ENVTL. JUSTICE LEADERSHIP
FORUM ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ejleadershipforum.org/the-principals-of-
environmental-justice/ [https://perma.cc/G4LM-EAMU]. These principles were adapted
by the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 1991. The
Environmental Justice Leadership Forum has also crafted a set of principles that
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justice, with its achievements and disappointments, is instructive
as critique, as ideal, and as practical guidance for emerging law
and policy. Conceived broadly, in the energy sector, it speaks to
the distribution of energy-related environmental harms as well as
the environmental and economic benefits associated with the
shift away from fossil fuel dominance.
Second, there is a unique and time-sensitive context for
justice concerns in the energy transition; change is happening
quickly and discordant notions of fairness are competing for
validation in the energy policy space. Throughout its
development, for example, the Obama administration’s Clean
Power Plan, now stayed by the Supreme Court, faced critiques
from environmental justice groups, alongside lawsuits from coal
companies, both sounding in fairness.18 How fairness questions
resolve across this transitional landscape may solidify
assumptions and conceptual frames with long-lasting effects.
In this context, a key question becomes: Can the modern
movement engage this early transitional moment to build
environmental justice, conceived broadly, into the structure of a
low-carbon energy sector? A corollary question, just as
important, asks: What does the movement teach about the risks
of not doing so?
This article responds to these questions, but also
emphasizes they are questions that need to be asked repeatedly
as the energy sector evolves and in as many micro-contexts as
possible. The tenor of transition dialogue across the electric power
industry is notably different from what it was just two or three
years ago. There is widespread recognition, including among
utilities, that low-carbon policy drivers are here to stay. There are
many moving parts in this dynamic policy environment—political,
technical, economic, environmental, social—that will affect the
pace and extent of the energy sector’s transformation with
federal, state, regional, and local components. Returning to
environmental justice in the energy reform discourse again and
again—spanning these multiple contexts and governance scales—
can help ensure that mistakes, oversights, and missed
opportunities are not replicated in emerging regimes.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I situates
environmental justice in modern environmental law. As this
part explains, the environmental justice movement has
translate environmental justice into the climate change context. See EJ Forum
Principles of Climate Justice, ENVTL. JUSTICE LEADERSHIP FORUM ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(July 28, 2015), http://www.ejleadershipforum.org/ej-forum-principles-of-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/SW6F-9JER].
18 The Clean Power Plan is discussed infra Parts II, III.
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succeeded in making justice a central concern in a wide range
of formal environmental law settings, yet structural barriers
persist that continue to undercut the goal of eliminating
disproportionate environmental harm in low-income communities
and communities of color. Part II addresses the low-carbon shift
that is roiling the electric power industry and the fairness
narratives competing for precedence as the industry finds itself
forced to evolve. The cautionary observation by Peter Newell,
writing on international energy policy, rings equally true for the
United States, when he notes, “the day to day governance of energy
is largely determined by producer or consumer (purchasing and
bargaining) power where questions of justice and equitable access
and distribution are easily marginalised in the context of market
transactions.”19 Combining the force of this “day to day governance”
with increasing industry appeals to fairness, there is reason to
worry that industry perspectives will overshadow environmental
justice goals. Part III highlights ways in which environmental
justice is already informing the low-carbon transition and considers
how structural integration of environmental justice in emerging
regimes might begin to be achieved.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE INMODERN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
The arc of the environmental justice movement, from its
emergence in the early 1980s to today, highlights both
achievements and frustrations that can inform justice goals for
energy transition.20 The movement’s important work solidified
environmental justice (EJ) as an integral consideration and
objective of the federal government, especially in the
administration of federal environmental law.
EJ advocates made their first federal inroads when they
convinced the George H. W. Bush administration to establish
an Environmental Equity Working Group in 1990. Two years
later, the administration formed the Office of Environmental
Equity (now the Office of Environmental Justice) within the
19 PETER NEWELL ET AL., U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, PURSUING CLEAN ENERGY
EQUITABLY 5 (2011), https://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/439774/5802284/10.+Newell+
et+al_HDR+2011+Research+Paper.pdf/82787b7a-966b-43cb-9922-e28f15de691d
[https://perma.cc/YG7M-NLXE].
20 For accounts of the movement’s development, see for example, THE QUEST
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 19–21
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND
UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT (2001); Bunyan Bryant, History and Issues of the Environmental Justice
Movement, in OUR BACKYARD: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3 (Gerald R.
Visgilio & Diana M. Whitelaw eds., 2003).
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) after the Working
Group concluded “racial minority and low-income populations
experience higher than average exposures to selected air
pollutants, hazardous waste facilities, [and] contaminated fish
and agricultural pesticides in the workplace.”21
This hard-fought recognition for the movement was
formalized more expansively in 1994 when President Bill
Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, requiring each federal
agency to develop an environmental justice strategy to identify
and address “disproportionately high and adverse human health
or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities
on minority populations and low-income populations.”22 Equipped
with the information these strategies would generate, the
executive order directed all federal agencies to make
environmental justice part of their missions to “the greatest
extent practicable and permitted by law.”23 Federal agencies
ranging from EPA, to the Department of Energy and Department
of the Interior, began developing environmental justice strategies
in accordance with the order.24
The next year, President Clinton assembled a National
Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) to advise the
administration on environmental justice concerns,25 and EPA
established an Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to review complaints
of environmental discrimination filed under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.26
The EJ movement replicated aspects of its success
garnering federal recognition at the state level and with influential
public interest environmental organizations. When EJ advocates
chastised these groups in the early 1990s for racial bias in policy
development and hiring, the best of them took the critique to heart
and expanded their missions to include environmental justice.27
21 S. REP. NO. 110-498, at 2 (2008) (quoting EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY
REDUCINGRISK FOR ALLCOMMUNITIES 3 (1992)).
22 Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, § 1-101 (Feb. 11, 1994).
23 Id.
24 Federal agency EJ plans are collected by EPA. See Federal Interagency
Working Group on Environmental Justice (EJ IWG), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
environmentaljustice/federal-interagency-working-group-environmental-justice-ej-iwg
[https://perma.cc/QX3V-Q9RW] (last updated Apr. 13, 2017).
25 See generally Environmental Justice: National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/national-environmental-justice-
advisory-council [https://perma.cc/28H2-HMHE].
26 See generally Civil Rights, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ocr [https://perma.cc/
Z9X3-LK4S] (last updated Apr. 7, 2017).
27 See, e.g., Heather Kathryn Ross, Righting Civil Wrongs, EARTHJUSTICE,
http://earthjustice.org/features/righting-civil-wrongs [https://perma.cc/E3NH-4HH7] (last
updated Feb. 12, 2017); Environmental Justice, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.
org/environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/FTY8-ZWNJ]; Protect the Health of Low-
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According to a fifty-state survey, the majority of states have
addressed EJ goals in some way by statute, regulation, or state
program.28 Examples include Arkansas’s Environmental Equity
Act for the siting of solid waste disposal facilities,29 the California
Environmental Protection Agency’s Intra-agency Environmental
Justice Strategy and Action Plan,30 and the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection’s Environmental Justice
Program, including an EJ Complaint Investigator.31
Yet the difficulty of preventing environmental injustice,
despite the movement’s genuine achievements, underscores
why the aim of integrating EJ into the basic infrastructure of
the energy transition is so important. Despite the indicia of
formal recognition for EJ’s importance, EJ results have
continued to disappoint. Influential EJ studies by the United
Church of Christ (UCC) capture this discouragement in stark
terms. A 1987 report on environmental injustice by the UCC
helped spur federal action in the 1990s, but a follow-up report
released in 2007 showed little had changed over two decades.32
The highly varied approaches to EJ at the state level have been
Income Communities, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/issues/protect-
health-low-income-communities [https://perma.cc/3XL7-6DUM]; Community Voices: Science,
Democracy, and Environmental Justice, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucs
usa.org/center-science-and-democracy/connecting-scientists-and-communities/community-
voices-science-democracy-environmental-justice#ejdefinition [https://perma.cc/LHF9-LVFE];
see also Andrea Y. Simpson, Public Hazard, Personal Peril: The Impact of Non-
Governmental Organizations on the Environmental Justice Movement, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB.
INT. 515 (2014) (case study of collaboration between environmental nonprofit and EJ
community affected by flame-retardant manufacturer and waste incinerator). But see
Patrice Lumumba Simms, On Diversity and Public Policymaking: An Environmental
Justice Perspective, 13 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 14, 14 (2012) (arguing “the ongoing
homogeneity of the environmental policy leadership continues to stand as a significant
barrier to the important objectives of current environmental justice efforts.”).
28 See generally UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS, PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST.,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF LEGISLATION, POLICIES AND
CASES (Steven Bonorris ed., 2010) (summarizing individual state EJ policies), https://gov.uc
hastings.edu/public-law/docs/ejreport-fourthedition.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VPG-5HWV];
see also Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Adam Weiss, Environmental Justice in Permitting:
State Innovations to Advance Accountability, 81 MISS. L.J. 747 (2012) (on U.S. state
policies and procedures to promote consideration of environmental justice in facility siting
and permitting); Steven Bonorris & Nicholas Targ, Environmental Justice in the
Laboratories of Democracy, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 44 (2010) (summarizing EJ
developments at the state level).
29 UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS, PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., supra note 28, at 13.
30 Id. at 17–18.
31 Id. at 45.
32 See COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987), http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.
net/unitedchurchofchrist/legacy_url/13567/toxwrace87.pdf?1418439935 [https://perma.cc/
27M4-NBHG]; ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES
AND RACE AT TWENTY 1987–2007, at 16 (2007), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/
toxic-wastes-and-race-at-twenty-1987-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q42-EVWX].
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both praised for their innovation and criticized for being
politically symbolic, rather than effective, policy.33 Concerned
members of Congress have repeatedly proposed bills to increase
the impact of environmental justice in federal law, bemoaning
the lack of progress and the inconsistent commitment across
administrations. In explaining the need for the Environmental
Justice Renewal Act in 2008, for example, Senate sponsors
observed that “[a]lthough the NEJAC met 16 times over 7 years
during the Clinton Administration, it ha[d] met only 5 times in 8
years during the Bush Administration.”34
EPA reinvigorated its commitment to environmental
justice in 2010, with a goal of marking the twentieth year of the
Clinton Executive Order with new and substantive progress. In
an effort to move more definitively past talking about
environmental justice to effectively rectifying and preventing
harm, the agency developed a new, multi-dimensional
environmental justice strategy and implementation plan—EJ
2014.35 One product of this effort is a detailed report, EJ 2014:
Legal Tools, in which EPA documented “leading opportunities”
across the statutory and regulatory work of the agency where
environmental justice could be addressed under existing
authority.36 The Legal Tools document identifies substantive and
procedural provisions that can be used to advance environmental
justice goals under the Clean Air Act (CAA);37 the Clean Water
Act (CWA);38 the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA);39 the
33 Compare Dunn & Weiss, supra note 28 (celebrating state policy
approaches), with Tonya Lewis & Jessica Owley, Symbolic Politics for Disempowered
Communities: State Environmental Justice Policies, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 183 (2014)
(concluding that state environmental justice policies are generally “more effective at
recognizing the plight of minority and low-income communities in regards to adverse
environmental conditions than they are at actually addressing the problem,” id. at 186,
and offering a case study of New York state).
34 S. REP. NO. 110-498, at 2 (2008).
35 See EPA, PLAN EJ 2014, at i–vi (2011), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.
cgi/P100DFCQ.PDF?Dockey=P100DFCQ.PDF [https://perma.cc/D94M-UXND].
36 See EPA, PLAN EJ 2014: LEGAL TOOLS 2 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-04/documents/planej2014legaltools.pdf [https://perma.cc/H36S-
PSHM]. This work builds on and updates EPA’s earlier work to implement EO 12898.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, EPA, to Steven A. Herman,
Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enf’t & Compliance Assistance et al. (Dec. 1, 2000), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/ej_permitting_authorities_memo_
120100.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HNA-JXDM].
37 Opportunities to consider environmental justice exist, for example, in the siting
requirements for solid waste incinerators under CAA section 129(a)(3), certain aspects of
standard setting for hazardous air pollutants under section 112, in establishing its
monitoring network to support a National Ambient Air Quality Standard under Section 109,
and in preconstruction New Source Review, among other provisions. EPA, supra note 36, at
4–22.
38 Opportunities for considering environmental justice exist under CWA section
303, for example, when EPA is “reviewing new or revised state and tribal water quality
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA);40 the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA);41 the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA);42
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA);43 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA, also known as the “Superfund” law);44 EPA’s tribal
standards to ensure that states and tribes are . . . providing adequate protection for
highly exposed populations,” in determining whether new or revised designated uses
are necessary for water body segments, or when establishing total maximum daily
loads for impaired waters. Id. at 23–29; see also id. at 30–36, highlighting EJ review
opportunities under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit
program under CWA section 402, as well as storm water management programs and
combined sewer overflows affecting EJ communities.
39 Opportunities for considering environmental justice under the SDWA, for
example, through implementation of the rules controlling lead in drinking water and with
regulatory and guidance revisions to underground injection control permitting with
“focused attention on minority, low-income, and indigenous populations.” Id. at 40–44.
40 Since enacted in 1969, NEPA has expressed the overarching goal of
ensuring “for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally
pleasing surroundings.” National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(2012) (emphasis added). As I have written elsewhere, environmental justice supplies
the practical and conceptual specificity needed to lend content to this otherwise
abstract ideal. Uma Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice: Integration,
Implementation, and Judicial Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 601 (2006). Thus
NEPA, perhaps more than any other statute, is readily amenable to include
environmental justice among considerations in an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement required in connection with major federal actions
affecting the environment. See EPA, supra note 36, at 83–85. Further, under CAA
section 309’s review provision, under which EPA reviews and comments on
environmental impacts of other agencies’ actions, EPA can “consider environmental
justice at each stage of the CAA section 309 review process.” Id. at 86. For more on
NEPA and environmental justice, see Alan Ramo, Environmental Justice as an
Essential Tool in Environmental Review Statutes: A New Look at Federal Policies and
Civil Rights Protections and California’s Recent Initiatives, 19 W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 41 (2013) (contrasting NEPA and federal civil rights for environmental justice with
California’s similar but broader state legal regimes); Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and
SEPA’s in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 565 (1997) (an early
take on the use of environmental review statutes for advancing environmental justice).
41 EPCRA section 303, for example, contains authority for guidance “on
considering environmental justice issues in preparing and implementing emergency
plans.” EPA, supra note 36, at 52.
42 Under FIFRA section 2, for example, the broad mandate to consider cost and
benefit factors can better include environmental justice considerations, and EPA can use
its section 3(c)(2)(B) authority to request data in a way tailored to gather “more focused
information on exposure to pesticides of farm workers and their children; minority, low-
income, and indigenous populations; or animals, water, land and other resources that are
of special importance to particular populations.” Id. at 57–64.
43 Under TSCA section 6, for example, EPA has broad authority to evaluate
and regulate a chemical substance if there “is ‘a reasonable basis to conclude’” that it
“presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” Id.
at 69. The balancing required for an “unreasonable risk” determination could allow for
the agency “to consider whether a risk is borne disproportionately by minority, low-
income, and indigenous populations in evaluating whether it may be ‘unreasonable.’” Id.
44 Under RCRA section 3005, for example, EPA may consider environmental
justice when it issues hazardous waste permits. Id. at 47–48. The EPA Environmental
Appeals Board has acknowledged “the relevance of disparities in health and environmental
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programs;45 as well as EPA’s grants and procurement authority.46
The agency also sought to enhance its EJ analysis of other federal
agencies’ work under its CAA Section 309 authority. Section 309
allows EPA to review the environmental impact statements
prepared by other agencies under NEPA when they are triggered
by a “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment.”47 In April 2011, EPA issued a
memorandum to guide this review process, urging each EPA
regional office to “fully utiliz[e] EPA’s authorities to advance
environmental justice in the course of complying with NEPA” and
“in connection with its review of other federal agencies’ NEPA
documents under CAA section 309.”48
For the public interest environmental community, this
refreshed focus was encouraging. As Professor Rachael Salcido
writes, EPA’s recent efforts were widely celebrated for “reviving
the EJ agenda.”49 At the same time, it is important to recognize
that this revival grew out of an acknowledgement that, decades
after the first federal recognition of environmental injustice,
disproportionate environmental harm in low-income communities
of color persisted. An underlying problem glares from the pages of
the Legal Tools’ carefully compiled “leading opportunities” for EJ
consideration: the core statutes of the federal environmental
canon do not protect or address, much less assure, environmental
justice. The amenable statutory and regulatory provisions
impacts” to permitting decisions, id. at 48, but does not recognize a “legal basis for
rejecting a RCRA permit application based solely upon alleged social or economic impacts
upon the community.” Id. at 48 (quoting In re Chemical Waste Mgmt. of Indiana, Inc., 6
E.A.D. 66, 73 (EAB 1995)). RCRA also allows for EJ consideration in contingency
planning, review of state permits, and facility siting standards. Id. at 48–50. Under
CERCLA, EPA may consider environmental justice, for example, in prioritizing non-
National Priorities List sites for cleanup, in identification of remedial alternatives, and
through the public participation component of remedial action plans. Id. at 53–54.
45 EPA could promote environmental justice under its Indian Policy, for
example, by interpreting statutory authority where possible to “eliminate the need for
tribes to show inherent authority over non-member activities” when tribes act as a
state under federal environmental statutes, as well as “clarify its interpretation of
some existing regulations to further the role of tribes.” Id. at 79–80.
46 See id. at 98–101. For more on efforts by the Obama administration to
reinvigorate federal environmental justice work through executive authority, see
Rachael E. Salcido, Reviving the Environmental Justice Agenda, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
115, 122–34 (2016).
47 See EPA, supra note 36, at 84 (citing NEPA § 102(c)).
48 Id. at 83; see Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r for Enf’t &
Compliance Assurance, EPA to Regional Administrators & Assistant Administrators
(Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-08/documents/nepa-
environmental-justice-memo-pg.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FAW-A4GY]. This memorandum
builds on the prior, EPA, Final Guidance for Consideration of Environmental Justice in
Clean Air Act 309 Reviews (1999), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-08/
documents/enviro_justice_309review.pdf [https://perma.cc/495M-YF8J].
49 Salcido, supra note 46, at 122.
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identified by EPA in the EJ 2014 effort, though encouraging in
their scope, depend on the use of discretionary authority.50 This
weakness remains a central concern today. Despite the hard work
of the Obama EPA, the start of a new administration reminds
advocates that, by definition, discretionary authority may be
exercised inconsistently and with varying degrees of commitment
to the issues EJ presents across executive transitions at the
federal level.
For each document associated with environmental justice
policy development, the agency disclaimer clarifies that it
“identifies internal Agency policies and recommended procedures
for EPA employees,” “is not a rule or regulation,” “may not apply
to a particular situation based upon the circumstances,” and “is
not legally enforceable.”51 The disclaimer appropriately mirrors
the intended scope of Executive Order 12898, which directed
federal agencies to pursue environmental justice to “the greatest
extent practicable and permitted by law,” but without providing
citizens with a right to judicial review.52 Thus, agency policy is
only as strong, committed, and effective as the plan people
comprising that agency at a given time work to implement.
An assessment of EJ 2014 by the General Accountability
Office (GAO), recognized “EPA’s renewed commitment to
environmental justice,” but also questioned whether EPA had
fully addressed management, staffing, and resources needed to
implement EJ 2014.53 More substantively, the GAO found EPA
insufficiently addressed the role of states in EJ 2014 strategies,
observing that “[w]ithout articulating clearly in its plans the roles
and responsibilities of states, EPA cannot ensure that states are
meaningfully involved in the planning and implementation of its
environmental justice integration efforts, including efforts
involving permits and enforcement and compliance.”54
Constitutional and statutory civil rights remedies, like
the Executive Order over most years since its issuance, have
provided weak protection in the EJ context as well. This reality
became clear when environmental justice advocates received a
stinging defeat in their effort to stop the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection from approving yet
50 EPA, supra note 36, at 2, 4, 23, 40, 47, 66.
51 EPA, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN
REGULATORY ANALYSIS, at iv (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-06/
documents/ejtg_5_6_16_v5.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/865A-HKUT].
52 Executive Order 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7632, § 6-609 (Feb. 11, 1994).
53 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-77, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
EPANEEDS TO TAKEADDITIONAL ACTIONS TOHELPENSURE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
31 (2011).
54 Id.
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another air polluting facility in the community of South
Camden, New Jersey.55 South Camden was already host to
Superfund sites, abandoned contaminated industrial sites,
chemical companies, waste facilities, food processing facilities, a
petroleum coke transfer station, regional sewage treatment plant
permits, trash incinerators, and a power plant.56 The community
sued and experienced early success in litigation, framed as a
Section 1983 action for disparate impact discrimination under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.57 Between South Camden’s
district court win and the opinion of the circuit court of appeals,
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Alexander v. Sandoval58 precluded
the disparate impact claim, leaving the community with no legal
recourse based on civil rights.59
Civil rights claims have faced institutional barriers as
well. This was true at the state level in the South Camden
case, where the community saw the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection as unresponsive to its concerns.60
This has also been true of EPA. In 2015, five communities filed
a lawsuit against EPA, alleging a “pattern and practice of
unreasonable delay” in the agency’s handling of civil rights
complaints.61 The Center for Public Integrity (CPI) recently
confirmed that EPA’s Office of Civil Rights has not once made a
formal finding of discrimination under Title VI, despite having
received hundreds of complaints, some exhaustively documented,
often left unaddressed for years.62 In 2016, the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights published conclusions to the same effect in a
lengthy assessment of EPA’s compliance and enforcement
actions related to EJ.63 In the words of one Louisiana resident
55 South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771, 775 (3d Cir. 2001).
56 Id. at 775; see also Sheila Foster, The Challenge of Environmental Justice,
1 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 1 (2004) (on the story of the South Camden case).
57 South Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 774.
58 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
59 South Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 790–91.
60 Id. at 775 (“Approximately 120 community members voiced their opinions
and concerns about St. Lawrence’s facility at the hearing” and plaintiffs requested a
grievance hearing with the NJDEP alleging “the NJDEP’s permit review procedures
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). The NJDEP proceeded to issue the
permit and did not respond to the grievance hearing request. Id.
61 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, Californians for
Renewable Energy v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-03292, 2015 WL 4509997 (N.D. Cal. July 15,
2015); see Environmental Justice, Denied, Environmental Racism Persists, and the EPA
Is One Reason Why, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.public
integrity.org/2015/08/03/17668/environmental-racism-persists-and-epa-one-reason-why
[https://perma.cc/Q4DF-8PSN].
62 Id.
63 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI
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interviewed for the CPI report, “[a]ll these complaints to EPA
have gotten us nothing—zero.”64
The agency responded to these critiques, not by denying
them, but by releasing for comment a draft strategic plan for
reinvigorating OCR review of Title VI complaints.65 When EPA
agreed in the spring of 2015 to investigate EJ impacts of
industrial hog farming in North Carolina, advocates celebrated,
but with exasperation over the time it took to get the agency’s
attention. As the Earthjustice attorney who filed the complaint
told the press, advocates had long been working for state level
reform while “[p]eople have been living with this and trying to
raise the civil rights issue, the health issue, the environmental
issue for years,” and calling change “so long overdue, people
have almost given up wanting the state to pay attention.”66
EPA continued to demonstrate its commitment to
advancing environmental justice in what was left of President
Obama’s term. In December 2015, the agency published a proposed
rule to improve civil rights protections and nondiscrimination
compliance.67 In May 2016, EPA released a final draft of EJ 2020
for comment, intending to build on the EJ 2014 plan.68 Early
drafts of EJ 2020 outline three goals for the next five years: “1.
Deepen environmental justice practice within EPA programs to
improve the health and environment of overburdened
communities; 2. Work with partners to expand our positive impact
within overburdened communities; and 3. Demonstrate progress on
significant national environmental justice challenges.”69 EJ 2020
ANDEXECUTIVEORDER 12,898 (2016), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_
Report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR2P-TGL4]. Findings include: “The EPA has a history
of being unable to meet its regulatory deadlines and experiences extreme delays in
responding to Title VI complaints in the area of environmental justice,” and “EPA’s Office
of Civil Rights has never made a formal finding of discrimination and has never denied or
withdrawn financial assistance from a recipient in its entire history, and has no mandate
to demand accountability within the EPA.” Id.
64 Environmental Justice, Denied, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://www.public
integrity.org/environment/environmental-justice-denied [https://perma.cc/93Y3-K7XR].
65 See EPA, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, EXTERNAL COMPLIANCE AND
COMPLAINTS PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2015–2020, at 3 (2015), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.
cc/VK3T-LHZD].
66 Robin Bravender, EPA: Agency to Launch Civil-Rights Probe of N.C. Hog
Farms, GREENWIRE (Feb. 26, 2015) (quoting Earthjustice attorney Marianne
Engelman Lado).
67 Proposed Rule, Nondiscrimination in Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency, 80 Fed. Reg. 77284
(Dec. 14, 2015).
68 See EPA, DRAFT EJ 2020 ACTION AGENDA: THE U.S. EPA’S
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGIC PLAN 2016–2020 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2016-05/documents/052216_ej_2020_strategic_plan_final_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N9FQ-LL9N].
69 Id. at 2.
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continues the focus on permitting, rulemaking, compliance and
enforcement, and science to advance environmental justice with an
eye to a set of key results. The report declares that by 2020 EPA
will: “Improve on-the-ground results for overburdened
communities . . . ; Institutionalize environmental justice
integration in EPA decision-making; Build robust partnerships
with states, tribes and other co-regulatory partners; Strengthen
our ability to take action on environmental justice and
cumulative impacts and; Better address complex national
environmental justice issues.”70 In an effort to make these goals
more concrete before the conclusion of the term, EPA published
Technical Guidance for Assessing Environmental Justice in
Regulatory Analysis in June 2016, to provide “methods for
analysts to use when assessing potential environmental-justice
concerns in national rules” and present best practices for use in
regulatory actions by the agency.71 On the last full day of
President Obama’s term, the EPA Office of Civil Rights issued a
finding of discrimination in a case stemming from a 1994 power
plant permit in Flint, Michigan.72 In a letter to the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), resolving the
case and formally ending the investigation, EPA concluded “the
preponderance of evidence supports a finding of discriminatory
treatment of African Americans by MDEQ in the public
participation process” from 1992 to 1994 during the permitting
for the plant.73 The letter also described “significant concerns
about MDEQ’s current public participation program and
whether MDEQ can ensure that these instances of discriminatory
treatment would not occur today.”74 Reverend Philip Schmitter,
who was among those who filed the complaint in 1992, told news
sources “[i]t’s late, but better late than never.”75
In sum, the committed efforts of the Obama administration
show it is possible to graft environmental justice concerns across
the environmental law canon, and it may be possible to do more
through the Office of Civil Rights. Notwithstanding the critiques it
faced, there is no question that the Obama EPA did much more
70 Id. at 7.
71 EPA, supra note 51.
72 Letter from Lilian S. Dorka, Dir., EPA External Civil Rights Compliance
Office of General Counsel, to Heidi Grether, Dir. of Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (Jan.
19, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/final-genesee-
complaint-letter-to-director-grether-1-19-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2NR-3FCL].
73 Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. at 17.
75 Arianna Skibell, EPA: At Obama’s Exit, a Rare Discrimination Finding in
Permit Case, GREENWIRE (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/10
60049050.
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than efforts in years past to advance EJ in meaningful ways.
But the record teaches that neither approach has offered
reliable protection. A successor administration that does not
share the same commitment could disregard the work—leaving
the legal tools unused.76 The lack of integration between
environmental justice and substantive law and policy has
allowed EJ to be positioned as a secondary—even cursory—
concern, addressed as a matter of procedure.77 In Professor Alice
Kaswan’s assessment, in the face of institutional barriers, bias,
and “power politics,” the movement to date has had an
“important, but ultimately modest, role . . . in influencing
environmental law.”78
Imagine, by contrast, if environmental justice were a
central and integrated aspect of state and federal statutory
mandates. Although Congress could always have acted to
amend federal environmental laws with EJ protections, the
present system, with a grafted, discretionary EJ analytical
frame seems to have solidified. As new law and policy is crafted
to advance the low-carbon transition, however—whether at the
federal level or more likely, at the state level in the near
term—there will be opportunities to consider a different,
integrated approach to social justice goals in the energy sector.
II. FAIRNESSDISCOURSE IN THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION
EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless
of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the
development and implementation of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies.”79 The environmental justice principles,
76 See, e.g., Brady Dennis, EPA Environmental Justice Leader Resigns, Amid
White House Plans to Dismantle Program, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-epa-environmental-justice-leader-resigns-2017
0309-story.html (on departure of EPA’s assistant administrator for environmental
justice, Mustafa Ali, early in the Trump administration transition in the wake of news
that key EJ programs would be defunded).
77 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the
Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975, 985, 1002 (2013) (describing environmental justice “as a
procedural overlay” and as a concept that is “more procedural than substantive, more a
framework of analytical questions”).
78 Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental Law, 24
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 149 (2013); see also Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights
and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental Justice’s Place in Environmental
Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2002) (arguing that “drastically different
problem paradigms” of civil rights and environmental protection “has impeded greater
progress in the integration” of EJ concerns “into the traditional environmental
regulatory framework”).
79 EPA, supra note 36, at 3.
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defined by the movement and interpreted for the climate and
energy context, take the concept much further. Among other
things, the Principles of Climate Justice, developed by the
Environmental Justice Leadership Forum on Climate Change,
emphasize fairness themes in calling for law and policy that
will work toward “a zero carbon economy.” Several of these key
principles include Principle 2, protect all “communities equally
from the environmental, health and social impacts of climate
change”; Principle 4, “[r]equire those most responsible for creating
the impacts that arise from climate change to bear the
proportionate cost of responding to the resulting economic, social,
and environmental crisis”; and Principle 7, create opportunities
for “all Americans, especially people-of-color, Indigenous Peoples
and low-income Americans, to experience a just transition” to
“living-wage, clean, safe, green jobs in the energy sector.”80
In the broadest sense, social justice demands climate
change action to reduce environmental harms, create new
energy and environmental benefits, and “close the EJ gap” in
climate impacts.81
But in immediate energy policy debates, other conceptions
compete for primacy. Industry and utility interests are staking
both direct claims of unfairness, based on how policies will affect
their business model, as well as indirect fairness-based claims, in
which potential harm to third parties is presented as a proxy of
sorts for the direct claims. Two contexts exemplify this aspect of
the energy transition discourse: distributed solar energy policy at
the state level and EPA’s Clean Power Plan rulemaking at the
federal level.
A. Distributed Solar Energy Policy
Electric utilities across the states are raising fairness
claims in reaction to the expansion of customer-generated
renewable electricity. Distributed generation (DG) is the
generation of electricity from decentralized small-scale sources in
contrast to traditional, utility-scale centralized power plants.82 DG
most commonly refers to rooftop solar systems on customer
property that generate electricity on the customer side of the
80 See EJ Forum Principles of Climate Justice, supra note 17.
81 See Policy Initiatives, ENVTL. JUSTICE LEADERSHIP FORUM ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.ejleadershipforum.org/policy-initiatives/ [https://perma.cc/L38Z-XS8M];
see also MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., supra note 8 (on addressing “climate gap” caused by
inequality).
82 For more on distributed generation generally, see, e.g., Distributed
Generation of Electricity and Its Environmental Impacts, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
energy/distributed-generation [https://perma.cc/XR8S-PE79].
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meter for on-site use. Other forms of DG, however, include
community solar, or shared renewable energy projects, that are
small-scale and located in close proximity to electricity
consumers, such as a shared solar array on an apartment complex
serving all tenants.83
To encourage distributed rooftop solar development,
over forty states have adopted some form of net energy
metering policy, by statute or by order of the state public utility
commission.84 As explained by the Interstate Renewable
Energy Council (IREC), net metering is essentially a “billing
arrangement by which customers receive credit on their utility
bills for energy generated by their on-site renewable energy
system.”85 Typically, net-metering programs have required a
utility to buy back any excess electric power a customer’s solar
system generates at the retail rate.86 That excess power then
enters the flow of electricity in the grid.
Today, rooftop solar is a rapidly growing market, and
utilities have begun to regard DG as a serious threat,87 although
the extent of DG proliferation is still low overall, is rising
quickly in a handful of states.88 The National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL) suggests utilities’ fears are mostly
anticipatory and “likely amplified by the simultaneous growth
in energy efficiency” as both erode customer demand.89 Growth
83 See Glossary, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, http://freeingthe
grid.org/#education-center/glossary/ [https://perma.cc/5E2X-QAJQ] (defining community
shared solar as “[a] model for shared solar projects that is designed to expand access to
energy consumers who are unable to go solar on their own home or business. Participants
receive credit on their utility bills for their portion of the clean power generated, much as
if those systems were located at their own home or business.”).
84 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY, NETMETERING (2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Net-Metering-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKA5-FZAL].
85 See Glossary, supra note 83.
86 State policies have recently begun trending away from requiring retail rate
compensation. For a recent discussion of the shifting ground in state solar policy,
including with regard to netmetering at retail rates, see Lincoln L. Davies, Making
Sense of the Rapidly Evolving Legal Landscape of Solar Energy Support Regimes, 6
KLRI J.L. & LEGIS. 81, 93 (2016).
87 See, e.g., Karen Henry, Solar Is a Serious Threat to Electric Utilities, ENERGY
MANAGERTODAY (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.energymanagertoday.com/dg-serious-challenge-
electric-utilities-0114379/ [https://perma.cc/P34E-QPQZ] (reporting that “[e]ighty percent of
electric utilities believe distributed generation [DG] . . . is a serious challenge to their
business”).
88 See, e.g., Julia Pyper, Inside the Minds of Regulators: How Different States
Are Dealing with Distributed Energy, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 29, 2015), http://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/what-are-the-most-pressing-issues-facing-public-utility-
commissioners [https://perma.cc/3ZVU-LMST] (discussing lessons that states with low
but growing DG might learn from states with high levels of DG on the grid, including
California, Texas, Minnesota, and Arizona).
89 GALEN BARBOSE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ON THE PATH TO
SUNSHOT: ADVANCING CONCENTRATING SOLAR POWER TECHNOLOGY, PERFORMANCE,
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forecasts vary, but the NREL projects that by 2020, residential
solar DG will still represent less than 3% of total residential
retail electricity sales on a nationwide basis.90 DG is expected
to exceed 5% in only ten states, though in two of those
penetration will be notably higher—California surpassing 30%
and Hawaii surpassing 50%.91 Extending the time horizon, the
picture does change significantly by some estimates, with
sixteen states exceeding 10% distributed solar.92
Nonetheless, utilities have lobbied in a number of states
to alter existing net-metering programs to make them less
attractive to customers or to supplement rates with new fixed
charges—applicable either only to DG customers or across all
customers—designed to compensate for lost returns. Both
approaches have been routinely framed in direct or, more
commonly, indirect fairness terms, and stem from concern, as
IREC explains, over “whether residential net metering customers
continue to pay a fair portion for the upkeep of the grid that they
rely on to net meter.”93 Alternatively, others are asking whether
DG offers net benefits to the grid and other ratepayers in the form
of reliability and clean energy.94 This has spurred intense debate
over how best to reflect the true value of distributed solar in
rates.95 Utilities claim that current policies unfairly benefit DG
customers, while advocates and others maintain they are
undervaluing benefits of increased DG on the grid.96
As the debate continues, utilities are getting through to
state legislatures and utility commissions. Nine states amended
their net-metering policies in 2015 alone, and another six states
AND DISPATCHABILITY 6–7 (2016), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65670.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H6TG-SVD2].
90 Id. at 6.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Emerging Issue: Fixed Charge Proposals Warrant Reasoned and Reasonable
Approach, FREEING THE GRID 2015, http://freeingthegrid.org/#education-center/emerging-
issue/ [https://perma.cc/3WSB-CCST].
94 See, e.g., Mark Muro & Devashree Saha, Rooftop Solar: Net Metering Is a
Net Benefit, BROOKINGS (May 23, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/
2016/05/23-rooftop-solar-net-metering-muro-saha# [https://perma.cc/7TCA-WWAR].
95 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Solar Panel Payments Set Off Fairness Debate,
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/business/solar-payments-
set-off-a-fairness-debate.html [https://perma.cc/B58K-V3RW].
96 See, e.g., Muro & Saha, supra note 94 (discussing the debate with emphasis on
benefits rooftop solar contribute to the grid); MIKE TAYLOR ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., VALUE OF SOLAR: PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS,
at vi, 12 (2015), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62361.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR7H-
KESU].
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have initiated review of their programs.97 Utility perspectives
have not prevailed in all instances—for example, Minnesota
made headlines for being the first state to provide a “value of
solar” tariff alternative to net metering, factoring in the social
cost of carbon avoided.98 But other states have modified policies
to diminish support for solar energy. Utility regulators in
Nevada, which had enjoyed a booming solar industry, voted to
eliminate its net-metering retail rate while increasing fixed
charges for solar customers.99
In his thoughtful analysis of fairness narratives in the
distributed solar debate, Professor Troy Rule isolates utilities’
three basic fairness arguments.100 The most common are indirect
claims of unfairness—what he calls the “fair share” argument,
alleging “Unfairness Toward Customers Without Rooftop Solar
Energy Systems,”101 and the “regressivity argument,” in which
utilities argue “Unfairness Toward Low-Income Utility
Customers.”102 The third and less common claim—likely because
it would be least compelling to policy makers and the public—is
direct and authentically motivating for the utilities asserting it,
the “Breach of Regulatory Contract” argument.103 This argument
captures the claim that DG policy is unfair to utilities and their
shareholders who, in exchange for submitting to more regulation
than most other private enterprises, have received monopoly
territories where they can charge customers for their services at
a price that affords a reasonable rate of return.104 Support for
DG arguably drains customer demand in what is supposed to
be an exclusive service territory.105
97 See CTR. FOR THENEWENERGYECON., 2015YEAR INREVIEW: STATEADVANCED
ENERGY LEGISLATION 4 (2016), http://www.aeltracker.org/graphics/uploads/2015-Year-in-
Review-State-Advanced-Energy-Legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9PX-PR9E].
98 See, e.g., Dan Haugen, Minnesota Becomes First State to Set ‘Value of
Solar’ Tariff, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/
2014/03/12/minnesota-becomes-first-state-to-set-value-of-solar-tariff/ [https://perma.cc/U
WS7-S5GH]. Because the value could exceed the retail rates applicable under net
metering, no utilities have opted to apply the new tariff. Value of Solar Tariff, DEP’T OF
ENERGY, http://energy.gov/savings/value-solar-tariff [https://perma.cc/Y3RV-H367]; see
also MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DIV. OF ENERGY RES., MINNESOTA VALUE OF SOLAR:
METHODOLOGY (2014), http://mn.gov/commerce-stat/pdfs/vos-methodology.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JZ3A-2V2E].
99 Julia Pyper, Does Nevada’s Controversial Net Metering Decision Set a
Precedent for the Nation?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.greentech
media.com/articles/read/nevada-net-metering-decision [https://perma.cc/Z33H-PAPJ].
100 Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE&ENERGY L. 115 (2014–15).
101 Id. at 129.
102 Id. at 135.
103 Id. at 138.
104 Id. at 139.
105 Id.
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Professor Rule disassembles each of the arguments. The
“fair share” argument weakens substantially when held up against
other modes of cross-subsidization that have long been built into
cost-of-service rates.106 The “regressivity” argument, that low-
income utility customers will shoulder costs for customers who can
afford rooftop solar, is likewise oversimplified. First, the argument
seems premised on an assumption that losses would necessarily be
borne by low-income customers rather than by shareholders. As
Rule notes, the argument conspicuously ignores the existence of
rate discounts for low-income customers in some states and the
availability of this option in states that have not yet provided this
safety net.107 Second, Rule is right to observe that weakening solar
incentives may also help to perpetuate energy-related harms that
disproportionately affect EJ communities living in close proximity
to fossil energy plants and production facilities.108 This is why EJ
advocates argue that policies supporting renewable energy, at the
distributed- and utility-scale, advance environmental and climate
justice principles.109
This connection is difficult to draw, of course, in the
context of a technical utility rate case, where the generic effect
of solar energy policy in reducing environmental harm is
remote compared to the localized immediacy of rising rates.
Groups representing low-income customers, which may include
EJ communities, commonly protest rate increases in these case
dockets.110 Yet the binary choice suggested between favoring
solar system owners or protecting low-income customers is a
false framing that clutters policy dialogue over DG’s growth.
Utility investors—though assured a reasonable rate of return
under the regulatory compact—have not been assured a specific
or necessarily favorable return. Risk is mitigated for investors
under the traditional model of utility regulation, but it does not
insulate shareholders entirely from political, technological, or
economic disruptions.111 For this reason, the “breach” argument,
essentially that DG interference with something approaching
rights in high electricity consumption, is weak.112
106 See id. at 131–32.
107 See id. at 136–37.
108 Id. at 137.
109 See The Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 17.
110 See, e.g., Mission, CITIZENUTIL. BD., http://citizensutilityboard.org/mission/
[https://perma.cc/WJR8-3G8S] (explaining how CUB “intervene[es] in ratemaking
proceedings before the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC)” and “in the courts to
represent the interests of residential utility customers across the state”).
111 See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
810 F.2d 1168, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring).
112 See Rule, supra note 100, at 138–40. I agree with Rule that if DG in fact were
to threaten utilities’ solvency, and thus essential electricity service, that would raise
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Apart from utilities’ fairness claims in net-metering and
value-of-solar debates, energy justice advocates have long sought
expanded access to distributed solar for EJ communities. Over
fifteen years ago, the Renewable Energy Policy Project developed
a Resolution on Sustainable Energy and Low-Income and
Minority Communities through “an extensive, consensus-based
process among representatives of groups focusing on
environmental justice, low-income energy advocacy, clean energy,
environmental, enterprise development, and Indian Country
issues.”113 The resolution grounds broad support for renewable
energy development in basic fairness, opening with the premise
that “everyone has the right to safe, clean, affordable, and reliable
energy and transportation services.”114 Distributed solar is
described as desirable, “appropriate ‘neighborhood technologies’
for urban areas.”115
Today, groups like the nonprofit Grid Alternatives and
Center for Social Inclusion promote low-income solar policy to
advance fairness and social justice in the energy sector. They
seek “equitable access” and participation so that all communities
are “part of our national transition to clean energy.”116 They
argue for inclusive policies to afford relief to low-income families
spending a “disproportionate amount” of their household income
on energy.117 They argue these inclusive policies are necessary to
ensure basic fairness given that “[l]ow-income communities bear
the brunt of pollution and climate change.”118
Even this brief discussion is sufficient to demonstrate that
competing conceptions of fairness in the distributed solar context
are widely divergent. Utility and community perspectives reflect
embedded value judgments about the desirability of promoting
solar energy and distributed generation. Their arguments reveal
marked differences in how fairness is conceived, spatially and
temporally—how boundaries are drawn around fairness questions
policy issues distinct from the fairness arguments being raised at this anticipatory point
in the DG growth trajectory. Id. at 134–35.
113 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, SPECIAL REPORT: RESOLUTION ON
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY AND LOW-INCOMEMINORITY COMMUNITIES 2 (2000).
114 Id. at 3.
115 Id. at 9.
116 GRID ALTERNATIVES ET AL., LOW-INCOME SOLAR POLICY GUIDE 7 (2016),
http://www.lowincomesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Low-Income-Solar-Policy-
Guide_3.11.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZC3-9HS8].
117 Id.
118 Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INTEGRATING PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS
INTO LOW-INCOME HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS: A CASE STUDY ON THE CREATION OF A
NEW RESIDENTIAL FINANCING MODEL AND LOW-INCOME RESIDENT JOB TRAINING
PROGRAM (2011) (demonstrating how benefits of solar energy can be more inclusive by
linking financing and job training policies to low-income housing).
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matters. Equity concerns presented within the confines of a rate
case convey differently in the broader policy dialogue of which
that rate case is a part. The fairness narratives described here are
in competition for primacy in evolving solar DG policy.
B. The Clean Power Plan
In 2014, under Clean Air Act authority, EPA proposed
“Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units.”119 This rule,
commonly known as the Clean Power Plan, proposed for the first
time to set greenhouse gas emissions guidelines for existing
power plants in the United States.120 EPA received over four
million comments during the public comment period121 and
published a revised final version of the rule on October 23,
2015.122
The stated purpose of the rule “is to protect human
health and the environment by reducing CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel-fired power plants,” which are “by far the largest
domestic stationary source of emissions of CO2.”123 With full
implementation, the Clean Power Plan is designed to “achieve
CO2 emission reductions from the utility power sector of
approximately 32 percent from the CO2 emission levels in
2005.”124 The rule is complicated, and its details are beyond the
scope of this article, but at its most basic, the Clean Power Plan
creates a framework for achieving CO2 emission performance
rates for existing fossil-fuel fired electric generation units
(EGU).125 The rule sets state-specific CO2 goals that take into
account each state’s unique mix of affected power plants, and
provides guidelines for states to develop plans for achieving the
119 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
120 Id.
121 See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.
gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 [https://perma.cc/B2PX-Q9K9].
122 Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan
Final Rule].
123 Id. at 64,664.
124 Id. at 64,665.
125 For information on the Clean Power Plan, see Clean Power Plan, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan [https://perma.cc/4PM6-7983]; E&E’s Power Plan
Hub, E&E NEWS, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan [https://perma.
cc/DT89-WHS7] (providing basic information and analysis of the Clean Power Plan and
pending litigation); Clean Power Plan: Megan Herzog, Resources on the Clean Power
Plan, LEGAL PLANET (Sept. 11, 2015), http://legal-planet.org/2015/09/11/resources-on-
the-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/3VSX-YFRS].
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required emission reductions. States are afforded a range of
options for crafting their plans, including collaboration with
other states126 and regional emissions trading programs.127
The entire rulemaking process was highly politicized
and the rule was embroiled in litigation even before it was
finalized.128 On February 6, 2016, in a decision that surprised
many, the Supreme Court granted a request from the rule’s
opponents for a stay pending judicial review.129 The merits of
the case were presented to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit en banc in September 2016.130 Although the
new Trump administration has stated it will seek to retract the
rule, it remains extremely valuable to the discussion of EJ in
the low-carbon shift for several reasons. First, the rulemaking
process revealed the kinds of fairness claims that have come to
characterize this energy transition. Second, the rule itself
outlined pathways for incorporating EJ in evolving energy
policy that can endure without the rule in place.
The Clean Power Plan presents an entirely distinct set of
legal questions from those relevant to distributed solar policy,
but discordant notions of fairness compete in similar ways in
both contexts. The competing narratives can be seen in public
comments submitted on the proposed rule. In its comments, the
National Environmental Justice Advisory Council expressed
support for “sharply reducing emissions of greenhouse gases” in
broad fairness terms, charging that “climate change policy should
address equity” and “the EPA has a fundamental obligation to
ensure equity while addressing this global threat.”131 In that vein,
the NEJAC critiqued the proposed rule for “seldom mention[ing]
equity and fail[ing] to ensure that environmental and
126 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,669.
127 See id. at 64,675.
128 See In re Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(denying request for preliminary injunction of proposed rule as premature in absence of
final agency action).
129 Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/15A773%20West%20Virginia%20
v.%20EPA%20-%20USSC%20stay%20order%20(M0118593xCECC6).pdf [https://perma.
cc/F3HB-QNTE].
130 See Order at 2, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17,
2016), http://www.ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Oral%20argument%20order%
20(en%20banc).pdf [https://perma.cc/JDD8-BXQL]; LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRAM. WYATT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44480, CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING
LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JC2T-8Y66].
131 National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, Comment Letter on
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units (May 21, 2017), http://ceed.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-NEJAC-
Clean-Power-Recommendation-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V93-YDMQ].
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technological benefits of the plan will reach EJ communities.”132
The Council articulated three recommendations to correct this
perceived flaw: (1) require that CO2 reductions occur in and near
EJ communities so they benefit from co-pollutant reductions;
(2) target renewable energy and energy efficiency development
in EJ communities; and (3) require states to account for EJ to
ensure equitable distribution of costs and benefits as they
develop implementation plans under the rule.133
The Environmental Justice Leadership Forum raised the
same critique against the Obama administration, expressing
concern that neither the President’s 2013 Climate Action Plan
nor the Clean Power Plan adequately addresses environmental
justice.134 The Forum reiterated long-standing opposition to
carbon trading mechanisms and nuclear power for exacerbating,
instead of alleviating, environmental harms to EJ communities,
despite their potential to cut carbon in the energy sector.135 The
Forum’s concrete requests, however, centered on fairness in the
distribution of harms and benefits under the rule. To avoid
harm, the Forum asked EPA to “include language that
recognizes and considers potential disparate impacts the rule
may have on environmental justice communities, and directs
states to identify environmental justice communities” and “take
steps to avoid or mitigate” disparate impacts.136 To ensure
benefits from the rule would be inclusive, the Forum called for
targeting renewable energy, energy efficiency, and actions to
leverage health improvements of the rule for EJ communities.137
In a subsequent letter after meeting with EPA representatives,
132 Id.
133 Id. The issue of co-pollutants for EJ communities is important, because
upgrades at a facility to cut carbon typically have the effect of also reducing other
harmful air pollutants that more directly affect the health of the local community. See,
e.g., Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51 (2012) (discussing this interaction and implications for
GHG regulation).
134 Environmental Justice Leadership Forum, Comment Letter on Clean
Power Plan EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-22585 [hereinafter Environmental
Justice Leadership Forum, Comment Letter]; see generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 6 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JBY-ABCA].
135 See id. at 2–3. When comprehensive climate change legislation seemed
possible in the late 2000s, advocates and scholars raised EJ concerns with emission
trading that should be revisited and refreshed for the coming decade. For a summary of
EJ objections to emissions trading, see ALICE KASWAN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM, THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: ISSUES TO WATCH 68–74 (2015), http://progressive
reform.org/articles/CPP_1506.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8WV-ECXL].
136 Environmental Justice Leadership Forum, Comment Letter, supra note
134, at 5.
137 See id. at 4–5.
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the Center on Race, Poverty, and Environment wrote EPA on
behalf of the Forum to more specifically request state plans be
required to “1) demonstrate emissions reductions in and near EJ
communities; 2) demonstrate the prioritized use of energy
efficiency and renewable energy in EJ communities; and 3)
determine the distributive costs and benefits to EJ communities
of the plan.”138 These examples capture the general tenor of the
many public comments grounding the fairness of the Clean
Power Plan proposed rule in the potential for harmful and
beneficial impacts on EJ communities.139
In stark contrast to the EJ critiques, utilities, the coal
industry, and coal-dependent states regard the Clean Power
Plan as threatening an excessive and unfair economic burden
against their interests. This fairness-based objection, alongside
legal arguments, carried over from the public comments into
the litigation that is still ongoing in the federal courts. Murray
Energy Corporation, which claims to be the largest underground
mining company in the country, sought, by extraordinary writ,
to enjoin the proposed rule from being finalized.140 In support of
this unsuccessful bid, Mr. Robert Murray’s Standing Addendum
emphasized the business losses he anticipated and a sense of
being unfairly targeted by the rule. He characterized the rule
as being EPA’s plan “for the shutting down and/or conversion of
even more coal-fired power plants than already planned as a
result of this piling on of regulation after regulation directly
aimed at coal.”141
138 Environmental Justice Leadership Forum on Climate Change, Comment
Letter on Clean Power Plan EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 (May 31, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-35464.
139 For more on EJ and the Clean Power Plan, see Alice Kaswan’s detailed
blog series for the Center for Progressive Reform. Alice Kaswan, The Clean Power Plan
and Environmental Justice: Part One, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM BLOG (Aug. 13,
2015), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=6EF50540-CFB2-7EEA-
104237BF37A2688C [https://perma.cc/ZL4J-2LJR]; Alice Kaswan, The Clean Power
Plan and Environmental Justice: Part Two, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM BLOG
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=6F3B659E-
E88E-E275-1DC49007DFE09E14 [https://perma.cc/EX8S-VN8T]; Alice Kaswan, The
Clean Power Plan and Environmental Justice: Part Three, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM BLOG (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
6FC636DC-D38C-53B5-50862030F359F0E3 [https://perma.cc/SDU3-EDRH].
140 See In reMurray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Murray
Energy Corp. website states: “Murray Energy Corporation is the largest privately owned
coal company in the United States, producing approximately 65 million tons of high quality
bituminous coal each year, and employing over 6,000 people in six states.” See About,
MURRAY ENERGY CORP., http://www.murrayenergycorp.com [https://perma.cc/J339-
JT72].
141 Opening Brief of Petitioner at 81, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-
1151 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2014).
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Intervenors Peabody Energy and others who, like
Murray Energy, opposed the Clean Power Plan, cited “concern
for disproportionate harm to coal-reliant States” as a reason for
the defeat of 2009 cap-and-trade legislation in Congress that
likewise warranted a rejection of this rule.142 Intervenors
quoted Senator Claire McCaskell’s concern that a cap-and-trade
program, which is an authorized compliance measure under the
Clean Power Plan, would “unfairly punish[ ] businesses and
families in coal-dependent states like Missouri.”143 With this
rule, Intervenors reasoned, EPA is forcing coal-dependent
“[s]tates (and their consumers, communities, businesses, and
utilities) to bear the burden for a state objective that is global in
nature.”144 In doing so, they asserted, “EPA seeks to pit different
parts of the country against one another and to foist potentially
ruinous burdens on coal-reliant communities.”145 According to
Intervenors, a measure with fairness implications of this
“magnitude” is beyond the scope of an agency’s power and must
be passed by Congress.146
Casting the alleged unfairness of the Clean Power Plan
from another angle, Intervenors argued the rule’s “deliberate
targeting” of “coal-fueled power plants in particular” contrasts
with a light-touch approach to the transportation sector, which
also accounts for a high percentage of U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions.147 Pointing to the emissions profile of the
transportation sector, Intervenors asserted “transportation does
not face the same treatment.”148 Even as they rightly conceded
that EPA separately regulates greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles, they nonetheless claimed the agency “does not
embark on a ‘war’ against the automobile.”149 Instead, they
142 Opening Brief of Intervenors Dixon Bros., Inc. et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 19, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2016).
143 Id. at 19 n.19 (quoting Bradford Plumer, Analyzing the House Vote on
Waxman-Markey, NEW REPUBLIC (June 29, 2009), https://newrepublic.com/article/
50550/analyzing-the-house-vote-waxman-markey [https://perma.cc/2CE8-DQSG] (quoting
Sen. Claire McCaskill)).
144 Id. at 19.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 20.
148 Id.
149 Id. Under the Obama administration, EPA and the Department of
Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration have engaged in
joint rulemaking to regulate both average fuel economy and GHG emissions from new
motor vehicles. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,401 (May 7, 2010)
(finalizing standards applicable to passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium duty
passenger vehicles in model years 2012 through 2016). The rule estimates the program
would “result in approximately 960 million metric tons of total carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions reductions and approximately 1.8 billion barrels of oil savings
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asserted, EPA has in an “egregious way . . . single[d] out
certain disfavored entities to bear the burden of achieving a
goal that is national, indeed global, in nature.”150 Without going
so far as to call the Clean Power Plan an unconstitutional taking,
they cited takings law for the proposition that government may
not “forc[e] some people alone to bear burdens which in all
fairness and justice should be borne by the public as a whole.”151
Utilities and related industries assert indirect fairness-
based claims with reference to low-income electricity consumers
under the Clean Power Plan, just as they have in reference to
net-metering and distributed solar policy. Invoking an indirect
fairness approach similar to utilities’ in the solar DG debate,
Murray Energy’s CEO called the plan an assault on low-cost
electricity.152 In support of Murray Energy’s extraordinary writ,
fellow coal company Peabody Energy argued that harm from the
rule “will not be confined to coal producers and utilities” but will
also “inflict disproportionate harm on minorities” and the
elderly.153 The coal companies also argued indirect fairness
claims with reference to coal-producing communities. In both
settings, these assertions overlook the range of social justice
concerns that pertain to policy fairness, suggesting indirect
claims are proxies for these stakeholders’ primary concerns: the
“utility death spiral” and the diminishing dominance of coal in
the electricity sector.154
over the lifetime of vehicles sold in model years (MYs) 2012 through 2016.” Id. at
25,328; see also 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct.
15, 2012) (finalizing GHG emissions standards for model years 2017–2025). The rule
estimates the program will “save approximately 4 billion barrels of oil and to reduce
GHG emissions by equivalent of approximately 2 billion metric tons over the lifetimes
of those light duty vehicles produced in [model years] 2017–2025.” 2017 and Later
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,627. The standards will require the
equivalent of 54.5 miles per gallon fleetwide average if the “163 grams/mile of carbon
dioxide” standard “were achieved solely through improvements in fuel efficiency.” Id.
150 Opening Brief of Intervenors Dixon Bros., Inc. et al., supra note 142, at 40.
151 Id. at 40 n.39 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
152 Robert Murray, Destroying Affordable Electricity, INTELLIGENCER/WHEELING
NEWS REGISTER (Dec. 12, 2015), https://thewheelingalternative.silvrback.com/murray
[https://perma.cc/96NW-9FH4]. Mr. Murray is the president and CEO of Murray Energy
Corporation. Id.
153 Emergency Renewed Petition for Extraordinary Writ by Intervenor
Peabody Energy Corp. at 7–8, Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2015), ECF No.
1567796, http://www.ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Peabody%27s%20renewed
%20writ%20in%20full%20-%20file%20stamped%20(M0101851xCECC6).pdf [https://perma.
cc/3AQ3-Z84L].
154 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Costello & Ross C. Hemphill, Electric Utilities’ ‘Death
Spiral’: Hyperbole or Reality?, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 7 (2014) (assessing the characterization
and citing earlier “death spiral”moments in the history of the electricity industry).
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That is not to say that these indirect claims do not
gesture toward genuine equity issues presented by the low-
carbon shift—they do—but as the counter positions of EJ
advocates demonstrate, these issues are complex and nuanced.
Accounting for complexities may well resolve these unfairness
claims in ways that no longer align with the positions of the
parties asserting them.
For example, in addition to their direct claims of
unfairness, Intervenors in opposition to the Clean Power Plan
litigation advanced the fairness theme to assert the rule “will
result in the economic devastation of States and rural,
economically depressed communities that rely on coal.”155 The
effect on coal-producing communities is an important aspect of
the low-carbon transition that raises social justice concerns. As
Professor Pat McGinley has highlighted in his work, these
communities, dependent on coal mining for their livelihoods,
have suffered disproportionate environmental harms in service
to the rest of the nation’s electricity use.156 Having long-
suffered environmental and health burdens associated with
their reliance on the coal industry, many coal communities are
now suffering severe economic hardship as the energy sector
turns from coal to natural gas and renewable energy.157 In 2016,
President Obama took a step in this direction when he launched
the federal Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and
Economic Revitalization Initiative (the Power Initiative) “to
invest federal economic and workforce development resources in
communities and regions negatively impacted by changes in the
155 Opening Brief of Intervenors Dixon Bros., Inc. et al., supra note 142, at 40.
156 See Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to
Environmental and Social Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L.
304 (2013) (on the failure of environmental, political, and coal industry leaders to plan
for the hardships declining coal “portends for coalfield communities”); Patrick C.
McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop Removal: Environmental Injustice in
the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21 (2004) (on the environmental, economic,
and social justice in Appalachian communities).
157 See, e.g., ADELE MORRIS, BROOKINGS, BUILD A BETTER FUTURE FOR COAL
WORKERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/Build-a-Better-Future-for-Coal-Workers-and-their-Communities-Morris.
pdf [https://perma.cc/T52V-Y9FT] (reviewing challenges facing individuals and communities
dependent on the coal industry and arguing for a carbon tax to help fund programs to
support successful economic transitions in coal communities); TED STRICKLAND ET AL., CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, REVITALIZING APPALACHIA: HOW CONGRESS CAN CORRECT
DISTORTIONS IN THE COAL MARKET AND INVEST IN STRUGGLING COAL COMMUNITIES 1–5
(2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CoalCommunities-
report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7ME-VT28] (explaining economic hardship in coal reliant
communities and highlighting how federal laws have exacerbated the problem).
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coal economy.”158 To be sure, there is more to do to help these
struggling communities.159
The discordant fairness narratives described here, even if
they can be reconciled to some degree, are competing for attention
and priority in a rapidly evolving environment. Parsing the
fairness issues raised by this transitional moment is highly time-
sensitive. Reinforcing EJ notions of fairness and equity is
especially important when competing fairness claims can
obscure environmental justice advocacy and continuity in the
low-carbon transition. No one can doubt that the industry and
utility stakeholders will make themselves heard, in Congress, in
the state legislatures, and in the courts. By one estimate, utilities
have spent $400 million on energy-related lobbying in the last five
years alone160 If all voices deserve to be heard, it bears emphasis
just how stark the resource imbalance is in this space. If social
justice-based fairness is to be a guiding principle for emerging
law, policy, and institutions, it is critical that its advocates are not
drowned out by competing profit-driven fairness claims that may
or may not also gesture toward vulnerable communities.
To that end, the next section highlights examples of
energy transition approaches that are informed by environmental
justice and near-term possibilities for further advancing social
justice in the low-carbon shift.
III. LEARNING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Learning from environmental justice successes and
disappointments, a central, solvable problem has been the absence
of distributional concerns and inclusive environmental protection
in mandatory provisions of the major federal environmental laws
and companion state laws. This problem should readily inform the
low-carbon transition toward incorporating justice goals into
emerging state and federal structures.
Achieving this depends on the genuine connections
between environmental justice, energy, and climate being
amplified. The NAACP Climate Justice Program has worked to
raise awareness of these linkages through its study of power
plants, the focus of the Clean Power Plan, and their host
158 Power Initiative, U.S. ECON. DEV. ADMIN., https://www.eda.gov/power/
[https://perma.cc/9PXV-3AR8].
159 SeeMORRIS, supra note 157; STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 157.
160 SARA E. MURPHY, SUSTAINABLE INV. INST., IRRC INST., THE TOP 25 U.S.
ELECTRIC UTILITIES: CLIMATE CHANGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS 6 (2016),
http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FINAL-Climate-Change-Corporate-
Governance-and-Politics.pdf [https://perma.cc/L68Z-RQTD].
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communities. To do so, a recent study compared the EJ
performance of 378 coal-fired power plants in the United States.161
Of those, the study identified 75 plants that fail by EJ standards,
having a considerable and disproportionate impact on EJ
communities.162 Four million people live within three miles of
these failing plants where the average per capita income is
roughly $17,000.163 Over half are people of color.164 Some states
have made these connections by tying decisions related to
energy, or the benefits of energy policy, with EJ considerations.
In California, for example, locating a new power plant requires
a disproportionate impact siting assessment.165 In Delaware,
likewise, a portion of proceeds from the sale of CO2 allowances
goes to programs designed to help low-income ratepayers.166
Yet, as advocates stress the distribution of energy
pollution and transition benefits alike, it is clear that
environmental justice can inform the low-carbon shift in both
registers. In troubling patterns mirroring some of the same
disparities that exist in exposure to harm, inclusion for EJ
communities in transitional benefits has been disproportionately
low.167 Some nonprofit organizations, like Green for All and Grid
Alternatives, are working to connect EJ communities with the
economic opportunities of transition in the energy sector through
job training and solar affordable housing programs, but much
more can be done at the state and federal level to support
these efforts.168
Clean Power Plan implementation, particularly at the
state level, offered a structure for advancing EJ at the
intersection of energy and environmental law. Advocates’
161 NAACP, supra note 14, at 9.
162 Id. at 27.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS, supra note 28, at xvi.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., ROBERT POLLIN ET AL., DEP’T OF ECON. & POLITICAL ECON.
RESEARCH INST., GREEN PROSPERITY: HOW CLEAN-ENERGY POLICIES CAN FIGHT POVERTY
AND RAISE LIVING STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he
building of a clean-energy economy in the United States can . . . create new ‘pathways out
of poverty’ for the 78 million people in this country (roughly 25 percent of the population)
who are presently poor or near-poor, and raise living standards more generally for low-
income people in the United States”).
168 Green for All is a nonprofit organization that “works to build an inclusive
green economy strong enough to lift people out of poverty,” with a focus on renewable
energy and energy efficiency job training and access to these clean energy resources for
all communities. See About Us, GREEN FOR ALL, http://www.greenforall.org/about_us
[https://perma.cc/V2JF-YMNN]. Grid Alternatives is a nonprofit with a mission “to make
renewable energy technology and job training available to underserved communities.” See
Mission and History, GRID ALTERNATIVES, http://www.gridalternatives.org/about/about-
grid [https://perma.cc/BX8L-WVXW].
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participation in the public dialogue around this rulemaking had
an impact: there is significantly more focus on EJ and community
involvement in the final rule than there was in the proposed
version.169 Groups that played an active role in raising these
issues have reason to celebrate that achievement. Still, many of
the measures the Environmental Justice Leadership Forum
and others urged to be mandatory were only encouraged in the
final rule. For example, the final rule does not require states to
perform EJ analyses, as advocates urged, but the agency created
a new EJ screening tool to support states in crafting compliance
plans that advance environmental justice.170 Advocates hoped
the final rule would require states to engage EJ communities in
developing compliance plans, but instead the rule calls on states
to address how they engaged vulnerable communities in that
process.171 It does not mandate this engagement or provide a
mandatory structure for ensuring inclusion. Similarly, the rule
does not require states to prioritize renewable energy and
energy efficiency in EJ communities, but it did create an
incentive program designed to drive early investment in low-
income areas.172 In adhering to the discretionary nature of EJ
considerations under the Clean Air Act generally, the risk of
inconsistent attention inherent in discretionary authority
remained under this rule.
The lack of state EJ mandates in the Clean Power Plan,
and even the rule’s anticipated demise—however disappointing—
does not preclude informed and committed states from crafting
plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that make inclusion
and EJ notions of fairness concrete. Such efforts will be made
easier with access to EJ screening tools developed by the Obama
EPA and a growing movement toward localized energy models.
Moreover, the measures that might have comprised a compliance
plan do not have to depend on the Clean Power Plan structure.
Many states halted formal planning for Clean Power Plan
compliance after the Supreme Court’s stay of the rule, but many
169 Jalonne L. White-Newsome, Here’s How Environmental Justice Advocates
Improved Obama’s Clean Power Plan, GRIST (Aug. 13, 2015), http://grist.org/climate-
energy/heres-how-environmental-justice-advocates-improved-obamas-clean-power-plan/
[https://perma.cc/YJ35-HXLC]. Ms. White-Newsome is the director of federal policy for
the advocacy organization WE ACT for Environmental Justice. Id.
170 See EPA, EJ SCREENING REPORT FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN (2015), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/ejscreencpp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3
3F2-92LU] (produced as “companion piece” to the final rule for states to use in community
engagement and development of state plans).
171 White-Newsome, supra note 169.
172 Id.
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others are continuing to plan for a low-carbon shift, with or
without the Clean Power Plan.173
States on a low-carbon trajectory can do everything
required by the Clean Power Plan without it and more on their
own. The “green zones” concept, for example, which identifies
“overburdened and underserved communities,” can be adapted
as a framework in mandatory thresholds for community solar
or other distributed renewables or for geographic limits on
emissions allowances in trading programs.174 If a state
participates in an emissions trading program over some EJ
groups’ objections, it might mitigate the concerns with protective
measures, like eliminating emission reduction credits for
facilities in EJ communities.175 A state might institute EJ as a
guiding principle for retirements and upgrades for electric
generating units at power plants, bringing distributed renewable
energy and energy efficiency to EJ communities and reducing
energy bills. States can modify the mandates on public utility
commissions to strengthen protections for low-income ratepayers
facing rising electricity rates due to transitional policies or
climate change impacts. These examples are just a few among
the kinds of measures that environmental justice brings to the
energy policy space.
Within the Clean Power Plan’s cooperative structure,
and more broadly across the energy sector, the low-carbon shift
is proving to be a largely decentralized transition. This presents
challenges and opportunities for EJ advocacy. Much of the energy
law and policy development is occurring at the state level,
through public utility commissions and state legislatures that are
much less conversant in EJ concerns, principles, and strategies
than EPA or state environmental agencies. The learning curve for
these institutions is likely to be much higher. A decentralized
transition also creates a challenge of highly dispersed subjects for
EJ analysis—there are wide-ranging and continuously evolving
state and local infrastructures for the low-carbon transition.
Consolidated federal advocacy has advantages for groups working
173 See E&E’s Power Plan Hub, supra note 125 (summary map of post-stay
planning status across the states).
174 See ELLEN KERSTEN ET AL., USC PROGRAM FOR ENVTL. & REGIONAL EQUITY,
COLL. OF NAT’L RES., FACING THE CLIMATE GAP: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
COMMUNITIES ARE LEADING THE WAY TO A MORE SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE
CALIFORNIA 4 (2012), https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/FacingTheClimateGap_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YDR-AU38]; CAL. ENVTL. JUSTICE ALL., GREEN ZONES FOR
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (2014), http://caleja.org//wp-content/
uploads/2014/03/greenzones_shortFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT9H-XQ7M].
175 See, e.g., Helen H. Kang, Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and
Opportunities—Lessons from the Field, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 121, 148 (2009).
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with very limited resources, and deep state-level campaigns are
difficult to staff and fund. At the same time, there are benefits to
advocacy that is closer to home—recognition of EJ in the
abstract at the federal level has too often seemed more symbolic
than substantive.
This transitional moment for the energy sector and
energy policy creates an opportunity to avoid repeating the
mistakes that have made the goal of environmental justice so
difficult to achieve. Professor Tseming Yang’s grounding
summary of EJ “deficiencies of the environmental regulatory
system” is an instructive starting point for evaluating
opportunities in emerging energy regimes.176 He grouped
environmental justice critiques as stemming mostly from three
such deficiencies: “1) the failure of regulations to provide
adequate substantive environmental protections for minorities
and the poor, 2) inequality and disproportionality in the
distribution of the burdens and benefits of regulations, and 3) the
inability of minority groups and the poor to participate actively
and effectively in environmental decision-making processes.”177
Adapted to analyze opportunities in the low-carbon shift,
these deficiencies might be avoided by asking in connection with
energy reforms, programs, and projects: Can a given reform,
program, or project be consciously crafted to both protect and
provide tangible benefits for EJ communities? Is the process for
developing the reform, program, or project affirmatively
inclusive, with resources to support meaningful, early
community engagement?
To preserve the full range of possibilities, a critical
element of transition policymaking will be to prevent fairness
frames that prioritize utilities’ interests from crowding out equity
goals clarified by the EJ movement in new legal infrastructures
for a low-carbon energy sector.
CONCLUSION
The conceptual expansion of environmental justice to the
energy and climate spheres builds on the movement’s core
values in ways that emphasize their relevance in the low-carbon
transition at an early stage. This article has focused on the
transition, rather than an end-point vision, because it presents
an imperative to reflect and to reimagine alternative pathways
176 Tseming Yang, Environmental Regulation, Tort Law and Environmental
Justice: What Could Have Been, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 607, 610 (2002).
177 Id.
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for developing inclusive law and policy. In turning for guidance
from the environmental justice movement, which has been
fundamentally concerned with fairness, this article considers
how it can inform the energy transition and its evolving legal
regimes. This is a question that must continue to be asked again
and again as the low-carbon shift alters U.S. patterns of energy
consumption and energy industries reorganize around new
economic and regulatory realities.
Ultimately, environmental justice speaks to more than
just instrument design—it can refresh the common
understanding of who and how energy and environmental
regulatory systems should serve. Even with progressive reforms,
law is a limited tool for advancing energy and environmental
justice. The late EJ advocate Luke Cole warned, “these struggles
are not about the law. They are about political and economic
power.”178 He rejected the notion that EJ communities
necessarily “need a lawyer,” and argued instead that the role of
law, and of lawyers serving EJ communities, should stay focused
on “building power and securing a place for our clients at the
negotiating table.”179 Or, as the executive director of the Center
for Race, Poverty, and the Environment, Caroline Farrell,
reflects, “public laws and policies constitute a ‘necessary but
insufficient condition for ensuring . . . equitable solutions.’”180
Conversely, the EJ movement teaches that political and
economic power imbalances will not be changed by purely
procedural measures and public participation alone. But as the
energy sector and legal regimes that structure it evolve, long-
standing power structures within the industry may recalibrate.
Among the discordant notions of fairness competing for
validation, environmental justice is at once the most enduring,
the most broadly instructive, and the most easily obscured by
energy industries’ lobbying advantages. Yet, if policymakers
can parse the fairness discourse, this transitional moment
opens a window for joining concrete policies with enhanced
178 Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice and the Three Great Myths of White
Americana, 14 HASTINGSW. N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 573, 582–84 (2008).
179 Id.; see also Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive
Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental
Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775, 779 (1998) (considering, through a case study
of Chester, Pennsylvania, the potential and limits of legal reform and legal action in
advancing environmental justice and the need “to redefine existing power relations”
and “create new political possibilities for historically marginalized communities in local
decision-making processes”).
180 Caroline Farrell, Just Transition: Lessons from the Environmental Justice
Movement, 4 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 55 (2012) (omission in original) (quoting
Julie Sze et al., Best in Show? Climate and Environmental Justice Policy in California,
2 ENVTL. JUST. J. 179, 184 (2009)).
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community engagement in ways that can correct persistent
harms and explicitly position EJ communities to reap the
economic and health benefits in the low-carbon shift.
